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Abstract 
I will address a challenge to mentalistic theories of norms, such as that developed by Cristiano 
Castelfranchi and Rosaria Conte, namely, the existence of large normative systems, which successfully 
direct people’s thoughts and actions without being, in their entirety, mental contents of individual agents.  
I will argue that the cognitive attitudes and operations involved in compliance with normative systems are 
usually different from those involved in complying with isolated social norms. While isolated norms must 
be stored in the memory of the agents endorsing them, this does not happen with regard to large normative 
systems.  In the latter case, the agent adopts a general policy-based intention to comply with the normative 
system as a whole, an intention that provides an abstract motivation for specific acts of compliance, once 
the agent has established that these acts are obligatory according the system. I will show how the 
endorsement of such a policy can be based on different individual attitudes, ranging from self-interest to 
altruistic, social or moral motivations. Finally, I will analyse how a normative system may both constrain 
powers and extend them, relying on this abstract motivation of its addressees. 
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INTENTIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NORMATIVE SYSTEMS 
Giovanni Sartor* 
1. Introduction 
The theory of norms is one of the (many) areas where Cristiano Castelfranchi has produced influential 
contributions, relevant to multiple disciplines (psychology, sociology, computing, legal theory, etc.). 
In his seminal book on “Cognitive and social action”, co-authored with Rosaria Conte, an original 
perspective on normativity is developed, where norms are understood as twofold objects, having a 
mental as well as a societal  side. Norms are viewed as complex mental objects, resulting from an 
architecture of goals and beliefs (Conte and Castelfranchi 1995, Ch. 5, 6, 7). In particular, Conte and 
Castelfranchi start with the idea that a normative belief consist in the belief that for everybody it is 
obligatory to accomplish a certain action. They argue that such a belief presupposes the belief that 
someone, the sovereign, wants the obligation to hold, and is accompanied by further beliefs about the 
sovereign, namely that the sovereign is disinterested and pursues legitimate goals.  Finally, they argue 
that one’s goal to perform an action is normative if it is relativised to the existence of a corresponding 
normative belief (the goal is pursued as long as the normative belief is held). Conte and 
Castelfranchi’s account also includes the analysis of how one becomes a defender of a norm, rather 
than merely an addressee of it, and how normative attitudes can spread in society. 
These ideas have been further developed in a number of contributions, where Castelfranchi and his 
col- leagues have broadened and deepened their analysis of normative attitudes and behaviour, and of 
the social dynamics related to the emergence of norms (Andrighetto et al. 2007). Moreover the 
analysis of normative aspects has been felicitously connected to other domains of inquiry, such as trust 
and conventions (see for instance among the recent contributions, Tummolini and Castelfranchi 2006, 
Tummolini et al. 2011). 
I will here address a challenge  to mentalistic theories of norms, i.e., the views that a norm’s  existence 
results from the norm itself being the content of appropriate mental states of the concerned agents 
(such as the shared belief that the norm is binding, and the goal or intention to comply with it). This 
challenge results from the fact that we follow not only shared social norms, but also complex 
normative systems: while shared social norms are represented in the mind of the concerned agents, 
large normative systems direct people’s thoughts and actions without becoming, as a whole, mental 
objects for individuals.1 We are often faced with systems of this kind in our daily life (the legal 
system, but also the prescriptions of an institutionalised religion, or the regulations of a company, a 
condominium, a regulated market, a teaching institution, a sociotechnical infrastructure such as an 
airport or a harbour, etc.). All norms of such a system cannot be stored in one’s memory since they 
exceed human capacities (at least for the largest normative systems, such as a municipal  law, 
containing many thousands, even millions,  of rules) and moreover such norms persistently  change as 
a consequence of intervening facts (such as the adoption of new regulations, new decisions 
interpreting,  them, etc.). For instance, while  each of us has some knowledge  of a few rules of our 
legal system (the ones corresponding to shared moral rules, such as the prohibition  of killing, or most 
frequently  encountered, such as certain traffic rules, or governing one’s particular activity, such as 
rules on software copyright for a computer programmer), generally the common citizen has a very 
                                                     
* To be published in In Paglieri, F., Tummolini,  L., Falcone, R., and Miceli, M., editors, The Goals of Cognition. Essays in 
Honor of Cristiano Castelfranchi. College Publications, London. 
1 The term agent is here used as in AI, to mean an entity endowed with cognitive  capacities and capable of autonomous 
action; it is not used in the legal-economical sense of someone delegated to act on behalf of another. 
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vague idea of the content the law of his or her country, especially in technical  domains such as tax 
law, land planning law, environmental law, etc. 
When referring to a large normative system N an agent usually does not immediately find an answer to 
the question “What ought I to do?” (As it usually happens when applying a shared social norm). One 
rather needs asks oneself (or the appropriate expert) “What does N require from me?”, i.e., “What 
ought I do to according to N?” The answer to this question (“I ought to do action A according to N”) 
does not have, by itself, a motivating force for the agent. It is not a normative belief of the kind 
described in Conte and Castelfranchi (1995), but a belief about what is entailed by a normative system 
in combination with the relevant facts. The concerned agent may well refuse to take into account the 
system’s requests (for instance one may ask oneself what a certain religion requires from oneself, 
without having the slightest intention to follow the prescriptions of that religion, whatever they may 
be). 
I will suggest that the motivation to perform a particular action qualified as obligatory by a normative 
system results from a general intention to comply with the system as a whole.  The latter attitude 
provides an abstract motivation for specific acts of compliance, once the addressee has established that 
certain actions are obligatory according to the system.  I will show how the endorsement of such an 
intention can be based on different individual attitudes. Finally, I will analyse how a normative 
systems may both constrain social powers and extend them, relying on this abstract attitude of its 
addressees.   
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2. Preliminary Notions: Actions, Obligations, Norms 
For analysing compliance, we need some basic notions. First, a way of expressing action and 
obligations is required. For actions I will use the simple E operator of Pörn (1977), though other action 
logics would be appropriate as well for this discussion of compliance (on the E operator see also 
Sergot 2001, for a different approach to action,  see for instance, Horty 2001). 
Definition 1 (Actions)   
Let proposition EjS describe agent j’s positive action consisting in the production of state of affairs S, 
where “S” is any proposition. Thus EjS means “j brings it about that S”. Similarly, let ¬EjS describe 
the negative action (the omission) consisting in not bringing about that S. Thus ¬EjS means “j omits to 
bring about that S” or “j does not bring it about that S”.  When the distinction between positive and 
negative action is not relevant, let us use Aj to cover both. Let 𝐴𝚥�  denote the complement of Aj (𝐴𝚥�  
stands for ¬EjS if Aj = EjS; it stands for EjS if Aj = ¬ EjS). 
For simplicity when an agent brings about its own action, I will not repeat the agent’s name in the 
action’s result. Thus, for expressing the idea that John smokes (John brings it about that he smokes, 
meaning that John does the action of smoking) rather than writing EJohnSmoke(John), I will write 
EJohnSmoke 
This notion of an action does not involve intentionality (an aspect which is involved in the notion of an 
action as a goal-directed behaviour in Conte and Castelfranchi 1995). I prefer to stick to this minimal 
understanding of agency since compliance with normative systems usually prescinds from an action’s 
intentionality: holding the required behaviour is usually sufficient for compliance. Intentions may 
instead be relevant for the consequences of violations (where intention may be required, or negligence, 
for certain normative consequences to take place), an aspect that I am not considering here. 
As an example of an action-proposition, consider the following 
 
EJohnDamaged(Tom)       (1) 
which means “John brings it about that Tom is damaged”, or more simply “John damages Tom” while 
the following 
¬EJohnDamaged(Tom)       (2) 
means “John does not bring it about is about that Tom is damaged”, or more simply “John does not 
damage Tom”. I do not need to discuss here the logic of E, which is a classical modal logic (if A and B 
are logically equivalent, then ExA → ExB), including inference rule  
𝐴¬𝐸𝑥𝐴       (3) 
and axiom schema 
ExS → S      (4) 
Inference rule (8) says that one cannot realise what is a logical theorem (a necessary truth). For 
instance since A ∨ ¬A is a necessary truth, being a theorem of propositional logic, Tom cannot be said 
to bring it about (it would hold independently of his action). 
Axiom schema (4) says that that if the state of affairs S is realised though an action, then it is the case 
that S. For instance the fact that Tom makes it so that Ann suffers damage, obviously entails that Ann 
suffers damage: 
ETomDamaged(Ann) → Damaged(Ann)      (5) 
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Definition 2 (Obligations and Prohibitions)   
Let Ø denote obligation. OEjS means “it is obligatory that j brings it about that S”. Similarly O¬EjS 
means “it is obligatory that j does not bring about that S”, or “it is forbidden that j brings about that 
S”. 
For instance, the following means “it is obligatory that John makes it so that Tom is compensated”, or 
more simply, “it is obligatory that John compensates Tom”, 
OEJohnCompensated(Tom)     (6) 
while the following means “it is obligatory that John does not makes it so that Tom is damaged”, or 
more simply, ”it is forbidden that John damages Tom”. 
O¬EJohnDamages(Tom)     (7)  
I will not specify here a particular deontic logic, since the following considerations may apply to 
different deontic logics. The reader may assume, for instance, standard deontic logic, as characterised 
in Føllesdal and Hilpinen 1971, but my preference would to a simpler deontic logic, limited to the 
substitution of logically equivalent formulas inside the deontic operator, namely, the schema:  
𝒜↔ℬ
𝑂𝒜 ↔𝑂ℬ     (8) 
Permission can be defined as usually as the negation of a prohibition: 
 𝒫𝓐 ≝  ¬𝑂?̅?  
To keep the language as simple as possible, I shall not address how a deontic language can be enriched 
through Hohfeldian concepts (for a logical analysis, Sartor 2006), and how this this extension can be 
useful for addressing compliance (Siena et al. 2009). While I am making use of the E action logic, I 
consider that the ideas on compliance here developed are generally compatible also with approaches to 
deontic reasoning based on different logics for action. 
Definition 3 (Norms)  
I represent norms as defeasible conditionals  [𝐴 𝑛⇒ 𝐵]     (9) 
 where A is a proposition and B is any kind of normative qualification,  deontic or non deontic, and  
𝑛
⇒ expresses normative conditionality,  namely the link between an antecedent (possibly empty) and 
the normative consequent that is generated by that antecedent. A norm including variables stands for 
the set of all of its ground instances. 
I take normative conditionals to be non truth-functional, but to allow for (defeasible) modus ponens. 
Note that the conditional A 
𝑛
⇒B is not a statement of fact, but can rather be viewed as rule, according 
to which consequent B is produced (it holds, according to the normative system being considered) 
when the antecedent A holds. Here is an example of two deontic norms, the first stating that it is 
forbidden to cause damage to others, and the second that who causes a damage to another has the 
obligation  to compensate the latter (in the following when obvious I drop the requirement x ≠ y): 
 [x ≠ y 
𝑛
⇒ O¬ExDamaged(y)]      (10) 
[x ≠ y ∧ ExDamaged(y)  
𝑛
⇒ OExCompensated(y)] 
The following is an example of a constitutive norm, saying that if we injure a person (make so that 
someone is injured), we cause damage to that person (injuring counts as damaging): 
[ExInjured(y) 
𝑛
⇒ ExDamaged(y)]     (11) 
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Also concerning the normative conditional 
𝑛
⇒ I will not provide a full logical account. I will just 
require that it enables defeasible detachment (modus ponens), i.e., that from A and norm A
𝑛
⇒B, the 
conclusion B can be inferred. 
{A, A 
𝑛
⇒B} |∼ B      (12) 
 I use the symbol |∼ for non-monotonic derivability, assuming that normative conditionals are 
inherently defeasible, but in this paper I will not discuss defeasibility and its logical treatment (see 
Prakken and Sartor 2003, Sartor 2011).  
Note that I do not distinguish deontic conditionals and constitutive or counts-as conditionals (Searle 
1995, Jones and Sergot 1996, Grossi et al. 2008), assuming that the same inferences apply to both (on 
normative conditionality, see Sartor 2005;  on the connection between deontic and constitutive 
conditionality,  see Boella and van der Torre 2006). The following example shows how from a 
conditional and an instance of its antecedent we can defeasibly derive an instance of the conditional’s 
consequent. 
   {ETomDamaged(John), ExDamaged(y) 
𝑛
⇒ OExCompensated(y)} |∼  (13) 
    OETomCompensated(John) 
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3. Relativised Normative Statements (in particular Obligations) 
In addressing compliance we have to connect a normative system N (a set of norms) and (the 
propositions describing) the factual circumstances C relevant to N’s application. Here I am only 
interested in the obligations and the institutional facts that are generated by norms in N, when applied 
to facts in C. Thus we can assume that C contains (or entails) all factual literals (atomic sentences or 
negations of them) which are true in the real or hypothetical situation (the world) in which the norms 
have to be applied, without considering how the truth of such literals can be established. For 
simplicity’s sake we can limit C to the factual literals that are relevant to the application of norms in N, 
matching literals in the antecedent of a norm in C. When the considered factual circumstances are 
those that hold in the real world (rather than in a merely possibly situation), i.e., they are the truths 
relevant to the application of N in the case at hand, I shall denote them through the expression T (N). 
I will now introduce relativised normative statements, expressing that a proposition (in particular, an 
obligation) holds with regard to a normative system. 
Definition 4 (Relativised Normative Statements) 
We say that any proposition B holds relatively to normative system N and circumstances C, and write 
[B]N,C iff N ∪C |~ B 
[B]N,C ≝ N ∪ C |~ B     (14) 
 
In particular when the proposition which is affirmed to hold is an obligation O𝒜x, we abbreviate the 
corresponding normative statements [O𝒜x]N,C as 𝕠N,C𝒜x. 
Definition 5 (Relativised Obligation-Statements) 
We say that it is obligatory relatively to N and C that x does A, and write 𝕠N,C𝒜x, to express that       
N∪ C |∼ O𝒜x: 
       𝕠N,C𝒜x ≝ N ∪ C |∼ O𝒜x     (15) 
According to Definition (5), a relativised obligation statement does not express a norm, but it 
expresses an assertion about the implications of norms (normative systems) and circumstances (in the 
terminology of Alchourrón 1969 and Alchourrón and Bulygin 1971 such assertions are called 
“normative propositions”). 
When we are referring to the true relevant circumstances of the real world—i.e., to the set of truths 
relevant to the application of N , denoted as T (N )—, rather than to circumstances of hypothetical 
situations, we simply write [B]N , or 𝕠N 𝒜x. 
      [B]N  ≝ N ∪ T (N ) |∼ B     (16)  
       𝕠N 𝒜x ≝ N ∪ T (N ) |∼ O𝒜x 
For instance, let us consider the following example, where N1 includes a simplified version of the three 
norms above, and C1 is limited to the fact that John injured Tom: 
Example 1 
                               C1 = {EJohnInjured(Tom)} 
Intentional Compliance with Normative Systems 
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N1 = {[ExInjured(y) 
𝑛
⇒  ExDamaged(y)]; 
    [O¬ExDamaged(y)];     (17) 
                                [ExDamaged(y) 
𝑛
⇒ OExCompensated(y)]} 
It is easy to see that the following inferences holds on the basis of example (1): 
 
(C1 ∪ N1) |∼ EJohnDamaged(Tom) 
(C1 ∪ N1) |∼ O¬EJohnDamaged(Tom) 
(C1 ∪ N1) |∼ OEJohnCompensated(Tom)   (18) 
Therefore, we can say that, relatively to N1 and C1, John has damaged Tom, it is obligatory that John 
does not damage Tom, and it is obligatory that John compensates Tom: 
[EJohnDamaged(Tom)]N1 ,C1 ∧ 𝕠N1 ,C1 ¬EJohnDamaged(Tom)∧ 
𝕠N1, C1 EJohnCompensated(Tom)     (19) 
 If John has really injured Tom (and no other relevant circumstances obtain, such as exception 
excluding the application of the norms at issue), i.e., if C1 = T (N1), we can simply say that according 
to N1, John has damaged Tom, he ought not to damage him, and he ought to compensate him: 
[EJohnDamaged(Tom)]N1 ∧ 𝕠N1 ¬EJohnDamaged(Tom)∧ 
𝕠N1 EJohnCompensated(Tom)     (20) 
Here is another small example. The first norm in N2 says that places open to the public are (count as) 
public places. The second says that if one is in a public place then one is forbidden to smoke. 
Example 2 
C2= {OpenToPublic(LectureRoom); in(John, LectureRoom); EJohnsmoke} 
N2 = {[OpenToPublic(y) 
𝑛
⇒ PublicPlace(y)];       (21) 
  [PublicPlace(y) ∧ in(x, y) 
𝑛
⇒ O¬ExSmoke]} 
We can say then say that according to N2 given circumstances C2 it is obligatory that John does not 
smoke (𝕠N2,C2¬ETomSmoke), and that John violates this obligation (ViolatedN2 ,C2) O¬EJohnsmoke)). 
The extent of the set of action obligatory according to normative system N depends on the content of 
N, but also on the deontic logic we have adopted for N. For instance, if we adopt standard deontic 
logic for N, then if N |∼ O𝒜 and 𝒜 → 𝓑, then N|∼ O𝓑. This will not hold if instead we adopt the 
minimal deontic logic we described above (which requires that 𝒜 ↔ 𝓑). 
We can however recover the extent of obligations according to standard deontic logic, by defining  a 
broader notion of a relativised  obligation. For instance, following the idea of a logic of satisfaction, 
we could say that action A is weakly obligatory, relatively to a normative system N, if   is entailed by 
actions that are obligatory relatively to the system. 
The language of relativised obligation allows us to say that according to different normative systems 
different obligations hold. For instance, given that Canon law contains a universal norm prohibiting 
the use of contraception as well as a constitutive rule saying any action meant to make a sex act 
unfruitful counts as artificial contraception, and given that taking the pill in order to prevent pregnancy 
is meant to make subsequent sex acts unfruitful, we can conclude that according to the Canon law a 
woman, say Ann, is forbidden to take the pill in order to prevent pregnancy.  Similarly, given that 
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Islamic law contains a norm that prohibits receiving interest on loans of money, we can say that 
according to Islamic law John is forbidden to receive interest on loans of money. 
A notion of relativised permission can be provided that corresponds to the above analysis of an 
obligation. 
Definition 6 (Relativised Permission) 
Let us say that it is permissible relatively to N and C that x does 𝒜, and write ℙN,C𝒜x  iff N and C 
entail P𝒜 x: 
ℙN,C𝒜x  ≝ N ∪ C |∼ P𝒜 x     (22) 
Note that according to this definition,  saying that an action ExS is permissible relatively to normative 
system N and circumstances C (ℙN,C ExS) does not amount to saying that it is not the case that ExS is 
forbidden relatively to the same system and circumstances (¬𝕆N,C ¬ ExS).  Proposition ℙN,CExS is not 
equivalent to ¬𝕆N,C¬ExS, since the former holds when N ∪ C entails PExS, while the latter holds when 
N ∪ C does not entail O¬ExS (see Alchourrón 1969, Alchourrón and Bulygin  1971). 
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4. Compliance 
With the help of the notions introduced in the previous section, we can now address compliance.  The 
issue of compliance can arise in very different context, as the following examples shows: 
• Mary is appointed to a professorship.  She signs a contract stating her commitment to comply 
with the University regulations. 
• John enters a PhD program.  He is directed to the booklet containing the regulations he has to 
comply with. 
• Linda is appointed as a judge. She takes an oath to respect the Constitution and the laws of her 
country. 
• Adolf Eichmann enters the SS. He takes an oath of obedience to death to Adolph Hitler and the 
superiors he has designated. 
• Antony enters the Franciscan order. He promises to respect the body of regulations known as 
“The Rule of St. Francis” as well as the law of the Catholic Church. 
•  Mary, a shop-owner, receives a threats by gangsters belonging to a mafia organisation.  She 
chooses to comply with all rules imposed by that organisation (monthly protection money, code 
of silence, etc.) to avoid problems with the bad guys. 
• A digital agent enters and electronic marketplace. It commits to respect all rules of the 
marketplace.  
In all these contexts the agent has taken the commitment (adopted the intention to) comply with a 
certain normative system. We can distinguish different notions of compliance.  The first notion is 
behavioural compliance, which simply consist in behaving is such a way as to fulfil an obligation.2 
Definition 7 (Behavioural Compliance)  
An agent x behaviourally complies with an obligation O𝒜x of a normative system N , iff the obligation 
holds according to N and x’s behaviour counts as A according to N , i.e., iff 
𝕆N𝒜x ∧ [Ax]N )       (23) 
For instance, if a non-smoker does not smoke in a public office, ignoring that there is a prohibition to 
do so (she does not know about the prohibition in Example (2) above), she will still behaviourally 
comply with that prohibition.  She will do that even if she is taking a siesta, and therefore is not aware 
that she is not smoking. On the basis of this notion of behavioural compliance we can develop the idea 
of conscious compliance, which consists in complying with a an obligation, while being aware that it 
is entailed by a certain normative system. 
Definition 8 (Conscious Compliance)   
An agent x consciously complies with an obligation OExS of a normative system N, iff x behaviourally 
complies with the obligation, believes that the normative system entails that obligation, and is aware 
of doing the required action, i.e., iff 
𝕆N𝒜x ∧ [Ax]N   ∧ Belx  (𝕆N𝒜x) ∧ Belx   ([Ax]N  )     (24) 
                                                     
2 As above, I will often omit to make explicit reference to the circumstances in which  a normative  set N is to be applied, 
assuming that an implicit reference is made to T (N ), the true circumstances relevant to the application of N . 
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By assimilating knowledge and true belief we can say that x consciously complies with an obligation 
O𝒜x according to N iff x knows that, according to systems N, x is doing an action which is obligatory: 
Knowsx([𝒜x]N ) ∧ Knowsx(𝕆N 𝒜x)     (25) 
Many instances of compliance with norms in a legal system are unconscious:  the concerned agent is 
not aware that the law prescribes a certain behaviour, but behaves correspondingly, either motivated 
by moral or social norms or by any other factors (self interest, altruism, etc.). 
Intentional Compliance with Normative Systems 
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5. Intentional Compliance 
Here I am interested with acts of compliance motivated by the (belief) in the existence of an obligation 
relatively to a normative system. First of all the action considered must be intentional, namely 
motivated by the intention to perform it, and moreover such an intention must be motivated by the 
awareness of the obligation. 
Definition 9 (Intentional Compliance)  
An agent x intentionally complies with an obligation according to N, when N entails that obligation 
(𝕆N 𝒜x), and x’s belief that this is the case (Belx(𝕆N 𝒜x)) motivates x to intend to hold the prescribed 
behaviour (Intx𝒜x), which, in its turns motivates x to hold that behaviour (𝒜x). 
𝕆N 𝒜x ∧ (Belx(𝕆N 𝒜x)⊳𝑚 Intx 𝒜x) ∧ (Intx 𝒜x ⊳𝑚 [𝒜x]N)   (26) 
where ⊳𝑚 denotes motivation, understood as mental causation. 
This definition would require refinements, linked to the difficulties inherent to the notion of 
motivation, which I cannot address here. Let me just state that I take M1 ⊳𝑚 M2 to be true, when both 
M1 and M2 are true and the fact that the agent instantiated M1 was the reason why the agent 
subsequently instantiated M2. With regard to the notion of an intention, I assume that the 
unconditioned  intention  to perform an action or omission consists in having the chosen goal to 
perform the action (for a discussion  of the connection between goal and intentions, and for the 
proposal of a refined formalisation,  see Castelfranchi and Paglieri 2007): 
Intx𝒜 = CGoalxAx      (27) 
For my purpose (and given that I do not need to distinguish actions and omissions) this simple notion 
of an intention will suffice. 
Observe that one can perform an action wrongly believing that one is under an obligation. This is the 
situation where there is no obligation to behave in a certain way, but the agent believes that such an 
obligation exists. 
¬𝕆N 𝒜x ∧ (Belx(𝕆N 𝒜x) ⊳𝑚 Intx 𝒜x) ∧ (Intx 𝒜x  ⊳𝑚  𝒜x)   (28) 
Let us now consider again example (1), and assume that C1 = T(N) (C1 contains all true circumstances 
relevant to the application of N ). Given that 
𝕆N EJohnCompensated(Tom)      (29) 
we can say that John behaviourally complies with that obligation if John performs the obligatory ac- 
tion: 
EJohnCompensated(Tom)      (30) 
We can say that John intentionally complies if he has the obligation, and his awareness of having the 
obligation leads him to intend to perform the obligatory action, which leads him to perform it: 
BelJohn(ONEJohnCompensated(Tom)) ⊳𝑚 IntJohnEJohnCompensated(Tom)∧ 
 IntJohnEJohnCompensated(Tom) ⊳𝑚EJohnCompensated(Tom)   (31) 
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6. Compliance with a Normative System 
So far we have been considering compliance with a single obligation established by a normative 
systems. Now we need to consider compliance with a whole normative system, possibly including 
thousands of obligations (as any modern legal system). 
Definition 10 (Compliance with a Normative Systems)  
An agent x complies with a normative system N, iff x complies with all obligations established by N. In 
other words, x complies with N, iff x performs every action [𝒜x]i which is obligatory according to N: 
Compliesx(N) ≝ [𝒜x]1  ∧ . . . ∧ [𝒜x]n     (32) 
where [𝒜x]1  ∧ . . . ∧ [𝒜x]n is the conjunction of every action or omission [𝒜x]i such that 𝕆N[𝒜x]i, 
i.e., such that N ∪ T (N ) |∼ O[𝒜x]i.3 
Complying with the whole of a normative system N (rather than with a single obligation) can be the 
object of a deliberation,  on the basis of which an agent j adopts the corresponding goal, i.e., the goal 
of j’s own compliance, which becomes j’s intention to comply. Thus a consequentialist agent j, given 
that for him the utility of complying is higher than the utility of non-complying 
uj(Compliesj(N)) > uj (¬Compliesj (N))     (33) 
would  assume that the utility of performing the action of complying  (making so that he complies) is 
higher than the utility of omitting to do so 
ux(EjCompliesj(N )) > uj(¬EjCompliesj(N ))    (34)  
Consequently, given the principle  stated in definition (14) we can conclude that an agent j believing in 
Proposition (33) will adopt the intention achieve compliance. 
Int(EjCompliesj(N))      (35) 
However, it seems to me that the representation of the intention to comply in formula (35) above 
(namely, as an agent’s intention to achieve a state of affairs where every obligation of that agent is 
fulfilled) fails to capture the usual state of mind of of an agent who has decided to comply with a 
normative system. In fact, an agent usually cannot have a precise mental representation of the state of 
affairs of full compliance, as specified in definition (10), since the agent ignores the norms in the 
system, and therefore cannot know what needs to be done to achieve full compliance. For instance, we 
all know that our country has a legal system, some of us know a few criteria for identifying the norms 
belonging to that system, but none of us knows all or most norms it contains. How can we intend to 
realise a state of affair of which we are not aware? 
This objection be countered by conditionalising the actions to be performed to achieve compliance. 
Even if we cannot know what actions are obligatory, we can still intend to performs any action which 
happens to be obligatory. This is expressed by the following definition. 
Definition 11 (Compliance with a Normative Systems (Conditionalised Version))   
An agent x complies with a normative system N, iff x complies with all obligations established by N.  
In other words, x complies with N, iff whenever an action or omission by x, denoted as [𝒜x]1, is 
obligatory according to N, x performs it: 
                                                     
3 To avoid infinite conjunction of redundant action propositions, we may add the requirement and for each such [Ax ]i  there 
must exist an instance of a norm in N , whose conclusion is [OAx ]i . 
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Compliesx(N) ≝   ∧   (𝕆N [𝒜x]i → [𝒜x]i    (36) 
                                          i∈[1…n] 
where ∧𝑖∈[1…𝑛] (𝕆N [𝒜x]i → [𝒜x]i) stands for the conjunction of all formulas having the form 𝕆N 
[𝒜x]y → [𝒜x]y , one per each of x’s action [𝒜x]i prescribed by one of the norms of N. 
Also this representation, however, seems inadequate to me. Firstly, we do not know what antecedents 
of the conditionals included in the big conjunction will turn out to be true, and thus to what actions we 
are committing ourselves.  Can we as rational agent intend, without qualifications, to bring about full 
realisation of an open set of demands whose content is unknown to us? 
Secondly, even we could have a mental representation of the state of full compliance, we should know 
that this state of affairs is unlikely to happen: given the high number of obligations arising from the 
system, and the fact that we is not aware of many of them, we will most likely violate some of them, 
even though we are doing are best.  How can one intend to realise a state of affairs being aware that 
most likely this state of affairs will not take place? 
Thirdly, an agent committed to compliance should maintain its motivation even when the agent has 
failed to comply with one obligation, and even when when the agent deliberately chooses not to 
comply with one particular norm. But full compliance is an all or nothing state of affairs, which 
becomes impossible once one obligation is violated. 
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7. Policy-Based Intention to Comply 
It seems to me that rather than committing itself to achieving full compliance, a reasonable agent 
could consider adopting a general compliance policy, namely the policy of intending to perform any 
action which is obligatory according to N. Thus the intention to comply will appear to be a policy-
based intention, namely, an intention to act in a certain way under conditions characterised in a general 
way, so that they may be instantiated in different specific circumstances (on such policy-based 
intentions, see Bratman 1987, 87-92 and Bratman 1989,451 ff., for a formalisation in defeasible logic 
see Governatori et al. 2009, for some considerations, see also Sartor 2005, 31-40).   According to this 
policy, the agent will comply whenever the conditions are met, giving a separate and independent 
relevance to each opportunity for compliance: the agent may fail to comply in one occasion (when the 
agent ignores that the conditions are met, or when overriding reasons exist defeating the application of 
the policy), but still keep a defeasible commitment to the policy and be governed by it in other 
occasions. 
Definition 12 (Policy-Based Intentions)   
Let us represent policy-based intentions in the form: 
S  𝑖⇒ Intj 𝒜j      (37) 
where 
𝑖
⇒ is a non-truthfunctional connective (similar to 
𝑛
⇒ for norms), meaning that the state of affairs 
S (the belief that it holds) triggers agent j’s intention to do action 𝒜j. 
I assume that also that a modus ponens-like inference applies to 
𝑖
⇒, so that: 
{S, S 
𝑖
⇒ Intj 𝒜j } |∼ Intj (𝒜j)      (38)  
In fact, intentions often take a conditional form, which supports detachment. For instance, Tom, given 
that today is a working day and that he intends to work today if it is a working day, can conclude with 
the intention to work today.  
{workingDay(today), workingDay(today) 
𝑖
⇒ IntTomETomWork(today)} |∼ 
IntTomETomWork(today)         (39) 
Conditional intentions can have an abstract form, which enables multiple instantiations.  For instance, 
agent Tom may have the following policy-based intention to work on any working day x: 
workingDay(x) 
𝑖
⇒ IntTomETomWork(x)     (40) 
A general conditioned  intention  stands for the set of all of its ground instances, such as:  
workingDay(Tomorrow) 
𝑖
⇒ IntTomETomWork(Tomorrow)    (41) 
so that from such a general intention,  given a specific fact matching its antecedent, like 
workingDay(Tomorrow)    (42) 
Tom can infer the corresponding instance of the conclusion: 
        IntTom(ETomWork(Tomorrow))    (43) 
However, Tom does not need to store in his mind all of such ground instances (that he intends to work 
today if today is a working  that, that he intends to work tomorrow if tomorrow is a working  day, that 
he intends to work the day after tomorrow . . . ). he just needs the policy-based  intention  expressed in 
abstract terms, and can use it for specific inferences when needed. 
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Let us now consider how the commitment to comply with a normative system can be modelled as a 
policy- based intention. 
Definition 13 (Policy-Based Intention to Comply)   
An agent j’s commitment to comply with normative system N can be understood as the agent’s j 
conditioned intention to do any action 𝒜j that is obligatory according to N: 
𝕆N 𝒜j 
𝑖
⇒  Intj 𝒜j     (44) 
Assume, for instance that Tom, while being in a place open to the public, is considering the 
implications of the normative system N2  of example (2) (which says that places open to the public 
count  as public spaces, and that it is forbidden to smoke in public places). Then Tom can establish that 
he is forbidden to smoke according to N2: 
𝕆N2 (¬ETomSmoke)      (45) 
Assume also that Tom has adopted the following policy-based intention to comply with N2: 
𝕆N2 𝒜Tom 
𝑖
⇒   IntTom 𝒜Tom     (46) 
one of whose grounds instances is:  
𝕆N2 (¬ETomSmoke) 
𝑖
⇒ IntTom (¬ETomSmoke)   (47) 
From (45) and (47) Tom can conclude that he intends to abstain from smoking: 
IntTom (¬ETomSmoke)     (48) 
As this example shows, the meaning of the policy-based intention to comply consists in its inferential 
role: it works in the agent’s mind as defeasible rule, allowing the derivation of an instance of its 
conclusion given (the belief in) an instance of its antecedent. Its peculiarity in comparison to other 
inference policies is that its conclusion is an intention to be implemented, rather than a proposition to 
be believed.  In conclusion, we have found two ways to understand the commitment (intention) to 
comply with a normative system N by an agent j: 
• j’s intention to realise the state of affairs where all obligations directed to j are satisfied through 
its action (Intj (Ej Compliesj (N)) 
• j’s endorsement of the policy according to which j intends to comply with any N -obligation di- 
rected to itself (𝕆N 𝒜j 
𝑖
⇒  Intj 𝒜j) 
It seems to me that there is only a one-way dependency between these two intentions. Adopting the 
latter policy-based intention is the most obvious way to realise (at least to some extent) the state of 
affairs of one’s compliance.  However, the converse does not hold: j may adopt the compliance policy, 
even when j does not intend to realise full compliance, knowing that it is not possible to achieve it. 
Moreover,  such a policy may be limited by specific exceptions, whose detection would prevent the 
application of the policy (and would take j further away from full compliance),  as I shall argue in 
section (9). 
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8. Compliance by Different Kinds of Agents 
Compliance is neutral: the choice to comply with a normative system may result from the most 
different attitudes and goals. It is even doubtful whether in many cases a choice is involved in the 
adoption of the attitude to comply. When one lives in a certain community  one tends to adopt the 
norms which are endorsed and followed  in that community  without  the need of a specific act of 
choice. Correspondingly, when we know that our community has a normative system, but we don’t 
know what rules belong to that system, we tend to adopt a general policy to comply with whatever 
rules will belong to that system, i.e., the policy-based intention above described. This happens in the 
communities in which we participate without an explicit choice (such as a country, a local community, 
a family, etc.), but also in those organisations that we enter by choice (a university, a company, a sport 
club, etc.), where a compliant attitude appears as a natural implication of one’s choice to join a certain 
group or activity, rather than as a separate independent choice. Different explanations can be provided 
for the unreflected adoption of a determination to comply. For instance, it has been affirmed that 
humans are naturally endowed with the attitude of “docility”, meant as “the propensity to behave in 
socially approved ways and to refrain from behaving in ways that are disapproved”, and attitude that 
may have an evolutionary explanation since it “enhances human fitness tremendously by allowing 
children to enjoy a long period of dependence, and to acquire effective skills through learning” (Simon 
1983, 64). So, it seems that humans living within a certain organisation or community would 
“naturally” desire to be included and approved, and consequently adopt the goal (the intention) to 
comply with the norms of that organisation or community. 
This fact, however, does not exclude that one’s intention to comply may be the result of a deliberate 
choice. Such a choice may provide the motivation for compliance even when one has no desire to be 
involved in a certain organisation or community.  For instance a prisoner in concentration camp may 
choose to comply with the regulation of the camp, for fear of sanctions linked to non-compliance.  He 
may also criticise those who do not comply (rather than approving of their courage), for fear of 
retaliation. 
In other cases, a conscious deliberation to comply may support an existing insufficient commitment to 
do so. For instance a rebellious teenager may accept that he should comply with the school regulations 
(or with the law more generally) when convinced that non-compliance can easily get him into trouble. 
Even people already having a certain propensity to comply may engage in a deliberation on whether to 
comply or not, when critically assessing whether they should or not maintain this attitude. 
Different agents may have different ways of approaching the deliberation on whether they should 
comply with a norm or a normative system. For our purposes it is sufficient to focus on a broad 
category  of agents, consequentialist choosers, namely, agents choosing their actions on the basis on 
an assessment of the consequences of such actions, an assessments determined  by the expected utility 
(differential benefit) the agent expects as a result of the action. Here the notion of “result of an action” 
is understood is a very broad way, including the fact of adopting the action itself, as well as the further  
consequences of this fact (for a broad notion of consequentialism, see Pettit 1997). 
I will distinguish two aspects involved in the assessment of a choice by an agent: 
• the utility of action 𝒜x  according to agent x, denoted by ux𝒜x,  i.e., the measure of the net 
desirability of that choice, according to x’s assessment, 
• the impact of an action 𝒜x  on the well being of a subject y according to x, denoted by wy𝒜x, i.e., 
the measure of how much 𝒜x advances or diminishes y’s well-being, according to x’s 
assessment. 
Let us first characterise the general idea of a consequentialist chooser. 
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Definition 14 (Consequentialist Chooser)  
A consequentialist chooser x will intend to do an action 𝒜x whenever x believes that the expected 
utility of doing that action is superior to the utility of not doing it: 
Belx(ux(𝒜x) > ux(𝒜x)) → Intx 𝒜x    (49)  
Let us now distinguish different kinds of consequentialist choosers: 
• Self-centred (egoistic).  For a self-centred chooser x, the utility of a choice is equal to the 
choice’s impact on x’s own well-being: ux(𝒜x) = wx(𝒜x). 
• Altruistic. For an altruistic chooser x the utility of a choice corresponds to its impact on the 
wellbeing of a set of agents, possibly including also (but not only) x: ux (𝒜x) = wy 1 (𝒜x) + … + 
wym (𝒜x), where y1 . . . ym are the agents x considers relevant to its choice. 
• Communitarian. For a communitarian chooser x, the utility of a choice corresponds to its impact 
on the wellbeing of x’s community: ux(𝒜x) = wg (𝒜x), where g is the community x cares about. 
• Utilitarian. For a utilitarian chooser x, the utility of a choice corresponds to the sum of its 
impacts on the wellbeing of each human being ux(𝒜x) = wy1 (𝒜x) + . . . wy n (𝒜x) where y1 . . . yn 
are all human beings (by “utilitarianism”, I mean the idea that the “standard of what is right in 
conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned”, Mill 1991, Ch. 2). 
Clearly, different kinds of consequentialist choosers will take different actions in the same situation.  
For instance when an action positively affects x’s welfare, but negatively affects relevant others to a 
larger extent, a self-centred agent will do it, but an altruistic (or utilitarian) agent will not. However all 
consequentialist choosers act with the purpose of increasing utility, and consequently, they should 
address the issue of endorsing the general policy-based intention of fulfilling any obligation 
established by a certain normative system, i.e., the intention to comply  as expressed in by formula 
(44) above, in the following way. Assume that j believes that a higher utility will be obtained by 
adopting the policy to comply rather that by not having this policy (to express that a policy-based 
intention is considered as a whole in j’s reasoning about it, I enclose it in square brackets): 
 uj ([𝕆N 𝒜j 
𝑖
⇒  Intj 𝒜j]) > uj (¬[𝕆N 𝒜j 
𝑖
⇒  Intj 𝒜j])    (50) 
According to (50), making so that j has (acquires or maintains) the policy-based intention to comply is 
better than omitting to do that 
uj (Ej [𝕆N 𝒜j 
𝑖
⇒  Intj 𝒜j]) > uj (¬Ej [𝕆N 𝒜j 
𝑖
⇒  Intj 𝒜j])   (51) 
From (51), j can conclude that it intends to acquire (bring it about that it has) the intention-based 
policy to comply: 
Intj Ej [𝕆N 𝒜j 
𝑖
⇒  Intj (𝒜j])     (52) 
Executing such an action, i.e., achieving that intention, would consist in adopting the policy-based 
intention to comply, namely, being ready to form the intention to perform an action 𝒜j whenever (j 
believes that) this action is obligatory according to N. 
For my purposes I do not need to engage in a discussion of the logic of meta-intention.  It is sufficient 
to assume that a rational  agent x, having the intention to perform the action consisting in adopting  a 
(conditioned or unconditioned) intention  INTx will perform  such a mental action and acquire INTx, 
according to the following schema: 
IntxEx(INTx) → ExINTx      (53) 
 Given that actions are successful by formula (4) above, performing ExINTx entails acquiring INTx, i.e., 
in our example, adopting the policy-based intention to comply. 
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Various refinements and extensions of the consequentialist model of agency are indeed possible: 
intermediate positions could be distinguished (as when one is moderately altruistic, giving some 
importance to the well-being of others, but less importance than to one’s own well being) or 
egalitarian-prioritarian elements may be introduced (so that the differential welfare or certain people is 
more significant than that of others). The bounds of rationality could also be considered, and the ways 
in which the social environment influences attitudes and choices. Finally, the analysis of compliance 
could also go beyond consequentialist reasoning, extending to cases where compliance follows from a 
deontological ethics (for a discussion of deontology and consequentialism, see Baron et al. 1997) or 
from a religious faith. All these refinements and extensions of the model here proposed are beyond the 
scope of this contribution, where I will limit my analysis to the simplistic typology of consequentialist 
reasoners just proposed. 
Intentional Compliance with Normative Systems 
19 
9. Non-Compliance 
An agent may also choose not to comply or to be indifferent to compliance. We can distinguish 
different ideas in this regard. 
Firstly, the agent may be completely indifferent to compliance. In this case, for any obligation O𝒜j, 
the fact that the obligation is prescribed by N is no motivation for j to perform. From j’s perspective, 
the N -obligatoriness of an action is no reason to (intend to) do it (I write A /⇒ B to mean that the 
conditional A ⇒ B does not hold, is not applicable): 
𝕆N 𝒜j / 𝑖⇒  Intj 𝒜j    (54) 
 Secondly, the j may be diabolic,  as far as N is concerned (in the sense of wanting to violate N ’s 
obliga- tions just for the sake of doing it). For such a j, the very fact that an action Ax  is obligatory 
according to N provides a motivation  to violate N . In other terms, j has adopted the policy of doing 
the contrary of anything obligatory according to N : 
                𝕆N 𝒜j 
𝑖
⇒  Intj  𝒜j     (55) 
Thirdly, j’s commitment to compliance may be limited, since j together with the compliance policy 
also adopts one or more exception-policies to it, namely, rules stating that the compliance policy does 
not hold under certain conditions (such rules would be undercutters, in the model of Pollock 1995, see 
also Prakken and Sartor 1997 and Prakken 2010). Different defeasible compliers may recognise 
different exceptions. 
An opportunistic complier j (the bad man, see Holmes 1897) makes an exception to the compliance 
policy whenever j comes to believe that by violating an obligation it will get a higher personal 
advantage (well- being) than complying  with it.  Thus j would adopt the following reasoning policy, 
which blocks the defeasible compliance policy of formula (44) above whenever the utility of non-
compliance exceeds that of compliance: when the utility of doing 𝒜j is inferior to the utility of not 
doing it, then the obligatoriness of 𝒜j does not provide a (defeasibly sufficient) reason to have the 
intention to do it. 
wj 𝒜j  < wj 𝒜j 
𝑖
⇒  ( 𝕆N 𝒜j / 𝑖⇒  Intj 𝒜j )    (56) 
 Note that the opportunistic complier is not uncommitted toward compliance:  j still has the defeasible 
commitment to comply expressed by formula (44) above, but this commitment is overridden by the 
belief that non-compliance (in a particular case) would get j a better outcome. 
Effective sanctions could neutralise in many cases the opportunistic complier’s exception, by making 
it so that that for any action 𝒜j, j’s expected utility of non-compliance (once that the risk of sanctions 
is also taken into account) is inferior to the utility of compliance. This however depends of the 
expected impact of the sanction on j, namely, on the amount of the punishment and its probability, 
which should outweigh the advantage that 𝒜j would provide if there were no sanction. 
Not all exceptions to the compliance policy are determined by self-interest. For instance, if Ann 
believes in some versions of natural law, or in some doctrine supporting civil disobedience, she would 
make an exception to her policy to comply with N, whenever she believes the N requires her to do an 
action 𝒜Ann which is (unbearably) unjust. Thus Ann would adopt the following policy, according to 
which when an action of her is unjust, then its obligatoriness according to N is not a defeasibly 
sufficient reason for intending to do it: 
  Unjust(𝒜Ann) 
𝑖
⇒   (𝕆N 𝒜Ann / 𝑖⇒  IntAnnAAnn )   (57) 
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Other kinds of exceptions could be distinguished.  For instance an act utilitarian agent would make an 
exception to the compliance policy whenever it considers that complying causes more harm than good 
to humanity.  Similarly a corruptible agent would make an exception to the compliance policy when 
by non-complying the agent would get a substantial differential personal advantage (the amount 
required for leaning toward non-compliance, being inversely proportional to the corruptibility). 
Note that according to this construction of compliance, there is no direct clash (no-balancing) between 
one’s conditioned intention to comply and the reason for holding a different behaviour. Rather the 
agent needs to consider whether such reasons instantiate an undercutter for the agent’s intention to 
comply, i.e, whether they exclude the applicability of the compliance-policy to the situation under 
scrutiny. Such exception may also be introduced when an agent j is aware of its cognitive limitations. 
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10. Endorsement of Norms and Commitment to Comply 
Research on social norms has recently addressed social processes through which norms are shared in a 
community, namely, the interlinked processes of the social emergence of norms and of their 
immergence in the mind of the concerned agents (Andrighetto et al. 2007). Besides considering the 
spontaneous emergence of shared customary rules, also the psycho-social process involved in 
compliance with authoritative orders has been studied (Conte and Castelfranchi 1999). However, I 
think that a further step is required to adequately capture the reasoning involved in the application of 
complex norm-systems. 
Let us consider for instance a municipal tax law, such as the Italian one (which is a section of the 
larger Italian legal system).  First of all, very few people have precise knowledge of a large set of rules 
from Italian tax law, and nobody’s mind contains all of Italian tax law. It would be difficult to claim 
that such rules have “immerged” (and are stored) in the minds of Italian citizens since most the latter 
do not know (and have never known) most of those rules. What citizens share is only the ability to 
identify somehow the law in force in their country as distinguished from other laws (foreign or ancient 
laws) and a general commitment (in many  case a very qualified one), to comply with this law and 
possibly some criteria to identify its main contents.  Citizens also have some ideas on the implications 
of this law that are most important to them (e.g., that the law requires them to pay the income tax 
every year, that VAT has to be paid on purchases, etc.), but are unable to determine such implications 
with precision (on the distinction between identifying the law and determining its content, see Jori 
2011). 
Usually common citizens usually approach tax issues with the help of tax experts, who give them 
some indications of what obligations follow from tax law under specific real or hypothetical cases, 
what sanctions may follow from violating such obligations, what line of actions are most 
advantageous with regard to tax-law effects. On the basis of this fragmentary information, law-abiding 
people will determine how to comply with tax law. Let us try to analyse the reasoning process 
involved in applying this kind of normative information (and more generally all complex normative 
systems, such as advanced legal systems). 
Let us assume that Tom has a general commitment to comply the normative systems L (the law), 
which includes many tax regulation (without knowing what it the precise content of L).  In other 
words, he endorses the policy based intention to perform any action that is obligatory according to L 
(the law): 
𝕆L 𝒜Tom 
𝑖
⇒  Intj 𝒜Tom       (58) 
 Tom is now wondering whether he should pay income tax on the capital gains he obtained by selling 
his house. Being committed to comply with the law, but not knowing what the law requires from him, 
Tom asks the tax expert Ann for advise. Assume that the Ann remembers that there is a rule in the tax 
code that establishes the requirement to pay income taxes on capital gains, but vaguely remembers that 
there are exceptions to it. This prompts Ann to look for exceptions, and she finds indeed one matching 
houses. This exception says (in a simplified form) that capital gains from the sale of houses purchased 
more than 5 year before the sale and inhabited by the seller are exempted from income tax. Assume 
that Ann’s inquiry has let that to conclude that the legal system L contains certain norms: 
L ⊇   {SellsHouse(x) 
𝑛
⇒   OExPayI ncomeT axOnSale;  
 BoughtMoreThan5YearsBefore(x) ∧ H asI nhabitedH ouse(x) 𝑛⇒  (59) 
¬(SellsHouse(x) 
𝑛
⇒ OExPayIncomeTaxOnSale)} 
where the second norms in (59) says that under the indicated conditions the first one does not hold (is 
not applicable). 
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Ann then asks Tom whether at the time of the sale more that 5 years had elapsed from Tom’s purchase, 
and whether he has been living in the house. Assume that Tom replies positively to the first question 
and negatively to the second one. Then Ann says: “Dear, Tom, unfortunately you are legally bound to 
pay income tax on your gains”. In fact, by combining the law L with these factual circumstances (let 
us assume these circumstances are the only relevant ones), Ann can see that the following inference 
holds: 
L ∪ {¬HasInhabitedHouse(Tom)} |∼ OETomPayIncomeT axOnSale   (60) 
so that she can infer what she tells her client: 
𝕆L ETomPayI ncomeTaxOnSale      (61)  
If Tom asks for an explanation, Ann would probably answer by saying that whenever one was has not 
lived in the house one sells, then according to the law one has the obligation to pay income tax: 
SellsHouse(x) ∧ ¬HasInhabitedSoldHouse(x) → 𝕆L E(x)PayI ncomeTaxOnSale   (62)  
Note that formula (62) does not express a norm of L (there is no norm in L which has exactly that 
content, see formula (59)). More generally (62) is no norm at all, but rather is a general conditional  
statement about L, namely the statement that in case that the seller has not inhabited the sold house, 
then L entails that the seller has to pay taxes on capital gains. Similarly, if Ann were contacted by Tom 
before making the sale, she would tell him: “Since you have not inhabited the house, you will have to 
pay income tax on your capital gain”. 
I think that this example may suffice to show that norms included in large normative systems operate 
differently from social norms. When we learn social norms we permanently store them in our memory, 
as the content of appropriate normative beliefs and goals, so that they can directly govern our 
behaviour. On the contrary, we do not learn and store in our memory most norms included in a large 
normative systems. We rather possess some ideas about the existence of such a system and the ways to 
identify its content. When needed, we collect some fragmentary information about the system and 
combine this information with the relevant facts, both tasks being often delegated to experts.  On the 
basis of this information we can conclude that the system requires us to perform certain actions. By 
combining such conclusions with our general commitment to comply with the system we adopt 
intentions to perform such actions. 
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11. Compliance by Officers 
Certain normative systems have officers (typically judges) charged with ensuring compliance, in 
particular by sanctioning non-compliance. 
For each obligation OAx, let us denote with Punished(x), the situation where x is punished.  Let us 
assume for simplicity’s sake that a single compliance officer,  a judge named Jud, who is responsible 
for ascertaining and repressing all violations of N, and that the punishment is the same for all 
violations. In other words, let us assume that N contains a norm stating than whenever an obligation  
OAx  is violated, the obligatory  action not having been accomplished, it is Jud’s obligation to punish 
x: 
OAx  ∧  𝒜j  𝑛⇒   OEJudPunished(x)     (63)  
Note that for rule in formula (63) above to fire, OAx must be derivable from N itself in combination 
with the facts of the case (thus we do not need to substitute OAx with the metalevel normative 
proposition 𝕆𝒜x). 
This representation is a simplification with regard to complex normative systems, where we have 
multiple interlocked rules determining who is in charge for each kind of violation, and we need to 
distinguish offi- cers charged with providing evidence of violations, officers charged with establishing 
whether a violation has taken place and order a sanction, officers charged with carrying out the 
sanction.  In fact officers in a complex normative system have a shared task which is more complex 
that simple punishment, a task which may possibly be characterised as the development and 
maintenance of their normative system. To accomplish this task they need to coordinate, to some 
extent, their activities consisting in creating, modifying, interpreting and applying the norms in the 
system (see Shapiro 2002 who sees this activity as a shared cooperative activity in the sense of 
Bratman 1992). For the purposes of this paper, however, a simplistic analysis will suffice. 
Thus compliance by Jud (in its role as law enforcer) could be expressed as follows: 
CompliesWithJud(N) ≝∀ (x)( 𝕆N EJud Punished(x) → EJud Punished(x))   (64) 
Jud’s commitment to a policy-based intention to comply could be expressed as the intention to punish 
anybody it has the obligation to punish (namely, anybody who violated a norms): 
OEJudPunished(x) 
𝑖
⇒ IntJudEJudPunished(x)    (65) 
 Following  the reasoning in Sections 8 and 9 above we may consider the various conditions under 
which different judges, having different concerns, could adopt policy (65): they could adopt it out self-
interest (to advance their career, have a good reputation, etc.), altruism, communal interests, moral 
commitments, and any mixtures of these and other motivations. Moreover, they may subject this 
policy to various limitations. For instance, a corruptible judge will not apply the policy when there is 
great advantage to be gained through non-compliance. 
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12. Spreading Compliance 
I will not examine here the social determinants of compliance and the social factors that encourage or 
discourage compliance, which would require me to address the many issues dealing with the theory of 
social norms (see, for instance, Conte and Castelfranchi 2006, Bicchieri 2011) and their connection to 
legal systems. 
I will just observe that the expected utility of x complying with N often depends on how many other 
agents will comply with N, as officers or as private individuals. As the number of compliers of a 
normative systems N increases usually both the individual and social differential benefit of compliance 
(as compared to non-compliance) increases: in a context of compliance, legal and social sanctions for 
non-compliance are more likely to take place, compliance is more likely to have a socially beneficial 
effect, compliance can be viewed as an exercise in reciprocity. This explains why in a context of 
increased (decreased) compliance, individuals are usually more (less) motivated to comply: so both 
compliance and non-compliance tend to spread in the community. For most people there is a threshold 
of compliance-frequency that makes the utility of compliance positive, so that they would choose to 
comply when the threshold is overcome. However, this threshold may be different for different people 
(both officers or common fellows) who may be differently motivated (by the individual, social, or 
communal benefit of compliance). 
Thus, compliance by agents who are sufficiently motivated only where there is a higher compliance 
frequency may depend on whether there is a sufficient number of other agents sufficiently motivated 
at lower compliance levels, who can bootstrap the process. 
Clearly a more complex picture could be developed though a more accurate and diversified 
representation of motivations for compliance (see for instance Bénabou and Tirole 2006), which may 
indeed lead different agents to different choices. For instance one may comply with norms that others 
do not com- ply with, in order to better advertise one’s commitment to the common good, or to get a 
confirmation of one’s morality; a Kantian agent should be unmoved by the non-compliance by others 
to a norms the agent approves of; a “myopic” agent would only care about the compliance by the 
nearest neighbours, etc. 
I cannot here address all the many issues concerning the spreading of normative attitudes, an issue to 
which Castelfranchi and his colleagues have dedicated a number of important contributions (see for in- 
stance Andrighetto et al. 2007). One general consideration, however, is that people will have 
normative expectations about the compliance by others, and this expectation will be strengthened 
insofar  as other people as a matter of fact do comply. Here not only one’s belief in the value of having 
a certain normative system, but also reciprocity is at issue, as well as the fact that people will make 
their own choices (and take risks) on the basis of the factual expectation that others will comply. 
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13. The Morality of Compliance 
When a normative system N is generally complied with and enforced, there will be usually a general 
attitude of viewing compliance as morally obligatory.  This may indeed support the adoption of the 
intention to comply. 
Let us assume that an agent’s morality M (the set of moral norms the agent endorses) contains a norm 
stating the obligatoriness of whatever is obligatory (for any agent x) relatively to a certain normative 
system N: 
(𝕆N 𝒜x 
𝑛
⇒  O𝒜x) ∈ M      (66) 
If an agent j believes in proposition (66), and that 𝒜j is really obligatory according to N (i.e., that 
𝕆N 𝒜j ), j will conclude that the obligation to do 𝒜j is entailed by morality: 
M ∪ T (M ) |∼ O 𝒜x      (67)  
Thus, j will view action 𝒜j as morally obligatory (according to definition (5), i.e., j will believe that 
𝕆M 𝒜j      (68) 
Rule (66), when applied to the norms governing a political organisation (typically a state) expresses 
the idea of the political obligation, namely, the moral obligation to obey the law. 
The obligation to comply may be qualified by exceptions (e.g., one may argue that it is not morally 
obligatory to comply with norms enjoining a serious violation of human rights, or which are blatantly 
unjust or absurd) especially when non-compliance is done in public to convey a political message 
urging resistance or change, so that it may qualify as civil disobedience. 
The idea that that there is a moral obligation  to obey a normative  system N can contribute to 
compliance with N , as long as the concerned agent j is committed to do what is required by morality  
(as identified by j itself),  i.e., as long as j endorses the following policy: 
𝕆M 𝒜j 
𝑖
⇒ Intx𝒜j     (69) 
Thus j, believing that it has the obligation  to do action 𝒜j according to N (i.e, 𝕆N 𝒜j ) can use moral 
rule (66) to conclude that it has a moral obligation  to do 𝒜j (i.e., 𝕆M 𝒜j ) and consequently  use policy 
(69) to adopt the intention of doing 𝒜j. Those who endorse rule (66) will also tend to extend their 
moral condemnation to the violators of norms in N. 
In conclusion, moral beliefs may ground or reinforce the endorsement of a policy to comply, but this is 
not always the case, since the adoption of such a policy may also follows from self-interest or other 
motivations, as shown above. 
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14. Compliance and Social Power 
The model of compliance here proposed can be related to the theory of power and influence proposed 
in Castelfranchi (2003). The basic idea I will use is that an agent j influences another agent k when j 
makes it so that k adopts j’s goals, and that influence is a most important mechanism for social power. 
Let us assume a state of generalised compliance, so that all (or most) addressees of normative system 
N have adopted a policy-based intention to comply with N, according to the model indicated in 
formula (44) above. I will argue that under these conditions a normative systems can be an efficient 
machine not only for limiting, but also for producing influence and power. 
Obviously, normative systems can limit social influence. For instance, assume that John is physically 
stronger than Tom. If there were no legal system prohibiting the use of violence, John could influence 
Tom and induce him to (intend to) accomplish what John likes (working for John, paying John for 
protection, etc.), by threatening to use violence against Tom. However, this is no longer possible (or at 
least more difficult) when there is an effective legal system N which prohibits using violence against 
others. If John himself is rigorously committed to the policy to comply with N, then John will adopt 
the intention to abstain from prohibited actions, and therefore also from violence. In case John is not 
committed to compliance (or is only defeasibly committed to it, with his self-interest providing for an 
exception), the compliance of others (and in particular of the enforcement officers) will make it so that 
the criminal behaviour is prevented of at least made less attractive by the prospect of punishment. This 
should prevent the threat or make it not credible. Therefore John will not use the threat, or at least 
Tom will not be influenceable through it. 
Let us now examine how normative systems, rather than limiting social influence, can extend it. We 
need to consider that what obligations are generated by N depends on two factors: the norms in N and 
the true relevant factual circumstances T (N). This means that N can work as an input-output machine. 
The input consists in changes in T (N) (the creation of new relevant facts), and the output consists 
changes in the obligations entailed by N. The input can produce the output in two ways: (a) by 
providing (or removing) facts that produce obligations according to the norms in N, or (b) by changing 
the norms in N, these changes having an impact on the obligations derivable from N. In this section I 
will consider the first way of changing N’s obligations, and in the following I will address the latter. 
For instance a normative system can make orders binding (for instance, the orders of a military 
commander to a soldier, or of an employer or manager to a worker), by making obligatory for the 
addressee of an order to comply with it.  This idea could also be expressed by using the notion of 
institutional (norm-based) power (Jones and Sergot 1996, Gelati et al. 2002a, Sartor 2006, Hage 
2011b, Hage 2011a, Tummolini and Castelfranchi 2006), but here a simpler representation will be 
provided, without expressly formalising the concept of institutional power. Assume the system N 
contains  a rule according to which Ann has the obligation to do whatever action 𝒜Ann is ordered by 
her manager Tom (for simplicity I do not consider the limitation of such an obligation in modern legal 
systems, where the order must pertain to the execution of the work, and respect the worker’s rights and 
dignity): 
ETomOrder(𝒜Ann) 
𝑛
⇒  𝕆𝒜Ann    (70)  
Assume that Tom does indeed order Ann to do something (for instance, to draft the minutes of a 
meeting): 
ETomOrder(EAnnDraftMinutes)     (71) 
so that this action-proposition becomes one the true relevant facts  
(ETomOrder(EAnnDraftMinutes)) ∈ T (N ))    (72)  
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Given that N contains rule (70) and T (N) contains fact (71) the following holds: 
N ∪ T (N ) |∼ OEAnnDraftMinutes     (73) 
so that we can say that according to N it is indeed obligatory that Ann drafts the minutes 
𝕆N EAnnDraftMinutes      (74)  
Assume that Ann has adopted the general compliance policy of formula (44) above relatively to 
normative system N, so that she intends to do whatever action of her is obligatory according to N: 
 𝕆N 𝒜Ann 𝑖⇒ IntAnn 𝒜Ann     (75) 
Policy-based intention (75) and normative proposition (74) entail that Ann will adopt the intention to 
draft the minutes 
IntAnnEAnnDraftMinutes      (76)  
Thus, given that Ann is committed to comply with N, Tom can influence her. By ordering any action, 
he modifies T (N) and makes it so that N ∪ T (N) entails the obligatoriness of that action, which makes 
it so that Ann adopts the intention of doing that action. Note that this power by Tom does not depend 
on his personal qualities (Ann may dislike Tom or believe that he an incapable idiot), it only depends 
on the content of the normative system, on the relevant facts, and on Ann’s commitment to policy-
based intention (75). 
A normative system N can also provide individuals with the possibility of binding themselves, i.e., of 
undertaking obligations according to N, or more generally of creating any normative positions 
concerning themselves. For this purpose it is sufficient that N contains the following rule: 
[Ex Promise (𝒜x) 
𝑛
⇒ O𝒜x]     (77) 
meaning that whenever an x promises to do 𝒜 then x has the obligation  to do 𝒜. 
A complied with (and protected through sanctions or other means of social pressure) normative system 
containing the rule in (77) enables agents to create credible commitment for themselves (given the 
costs of non-compliance), on the basis of which others can act (e.g., I promise to give 1,000 euros to 
the person who will bring back to me my lost dog), or can be induced to take similar  commitments,  
as in contracts (on a more general approach to contract, which views  them as means to create not just 
obligations but any kind of normative  positions  see Gelati  et al. 2002b, Sartor 2006, Hage 2011b). 
For example, assume the following: 1) system N contains the rule in (77), 2) I promised that I will give 
1000 euros to the best law student of this year; 3) Ann is this year’s best law student. It follows that 
according to N , I have the obligation to give 1000 euros to Ann. 
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15. The Machine of the Law 
Let us now consider how an agent (a legislator) can have the ability to introduce new norms in N. For 
this purpose, we need to assume that N is a dynamic normative system (Kelsen 1967), including meta-
rules determining what new norms will belong to N. For simplicity I shall leave temporal aspects 
implicit even though they are essential in an adequate account of normative dynamics (see Governatori  
et al. 2007). So, let us assume that N includes a meta-norm saying that whatever norm φ is issued by 
the legislator Leg is included in N (φ is a variable ranging over norms): 
[ELeg Issued (φ) 
𝑛
⇒ φ ∈ N ]    (78) 
I cannot here develop the analysis of the dynamics of normative systems, which would require a 
discussion on how to model defeasibility and time (see for instance Governatori et al. 2006). Thus, for 
our purposes it is sufficient to characterise N as the minimal set satisfying the following equality: 
N = {[ELeg Issued (φ) 
𝑛
⇒  φ ∈ N ]} ∪ {ψ : N ∪ T (N ) |∼ ψ ∈ N }  (79) 
According to equation (79), N is defined as containing the meta-norm of (78) (which would work as 
the “constitution” in a logical sense of N, following Kelsen 1967) plus every other norm that is 
qualified as being in N according to N itself. i.e., any norm ψ (ψ is a variable ranging over norms such 
that N entails the proposition that ψ is contained in N (for a presentation  of this idea, see Sartor 2009, 
on modelling legal systems through metanorms, se also Yoshino 1995, Yoshino 1997 and Hernandez 
Marín and Sartor 1999). 
Alternatively we could assume that that the content of equality (79) is rephrased by a fundamental  
norm, which is not does not belong to N, but constitutes the ultimate ground for membership to N (as a 
Kelsenian Grundnorm, or as a Hartian rule of recognition, see Hart 1994). 
([ELeg Issued (φ) 
𝑛
⇒ φ ∈ N ] ∈ N ) ∧ ((N ∪ T (N) |∼ ψ ∈ N ) 
𝑛
⇒ ψ ∈ N )   (80) 
The two-pronged norm in (80), let us call it Fundamental, states the norm empowering  the legislator 
is in N, and that all norms are in N, whose membership to N is entailed by N itself.4 Then N can be 
defined as the minimal set of the norms whose legality is entailed by Fundamental, together with the 
relevant facts. 
N = {φ : (T (N) ∪ Fundamental) |∼ φ ∈ N }    (81) 
Given this background (i.e., either equation (79) or (81)), let us assume that legislator accomplishes 
the action of issuing a new norm, for instance, a norm prohibiting  any agent x to smoke: 
ELeg Issued(O¬ExSmoke)      (82)  
The accomplishment of the action described in this formula is a fact, which is added to the true factual 
circumstance T (N). With this addition, the following holds according to the rule of formula (78) above 
(when useful for clarity, I bracket norms included in meta-linguistic expression): 
N ∪ T (N) |∼ [O¬ExSmoke] ∈ N)     (83)  
Consequently N contains norm O¬ExSmoke, according to formula (79): 
[O¬ExSmoke] ∈ N      (84) 
Since it now holds that 
                                                     
4 The rule in (80) can also be rephrased as having a single conclusion  (using variables in a very liberal way): 
n n ((φ = [ELeg Issued(φ) 
𝑛
⇒ φ ∈ N ]) ∨ (N ∪ T (N ) |∼ φ ∈ N )) 
𝑛
⇒ φ ∈ N 
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N ∪ T (N) |∼ O¬ETomSmoke     (85) 
so that we can say that now smoking is forbidden to Tom according to N : 
         𝕆N ¬ETomSmoke      (86) 
The legislator  can use the power provided  by formula (78) above to put a judge in charge of 
punishing violators. To achieve this result, the legislator just has to perform the action of issuing a 
norm to that effect, namely a norm saying that the judge J ud should punish any agent who violates a 
norm in N , i.e., any agent who does the opposite of what is obligatory for that agent: 
ELegIssued(O𝒜x ∧ 𝒜x 
𝑛
⇒   OEJud Punished (x))     (87) 
As a consequence of this legislative action, N now contains the issued norm 
[O𝒜x ∧  𝒜x  
𝑛
⇒   OEJud Punished (x)] ∈ N    (88) 
with means that J ud has, according to N , the obligation to punish any violator. 
Assume now that both Ann and Jud have the policy-based intention to comply with N, and that Ann 
views non-compliance as immoral. Then, on the basis of the statement of the legislator, Ann will adopt 
the intention not to smoke, Jud will adopt the intention to punish smokers in public places, and Ann 
would believe that anyone who smokes in a public place behaves immorally. 
The legislator can also confer to another agent, the administrator Admin, the ability to insert new 
norms in N (delegated legislation) by enacting such norms (while respecting certain legal constraints 
on Admin’s legislative action): 
[ELegIssued(EAdminIssued(φ) ∧ EAdminRespectConstraints(φ)  
𝑛
⇒  φ ∈ N ]              (89) 
As a consequence of the action described in formula (89) and the characterisation of N in (79), the 
norm empowering Admin is now contained in N: 
[EAdminIssued(φ) ∧ EAdminRespectC onstraints(φ)  
𝑛
⇒  φ ∈ N ] ∈ N               (90) 
Consequently whatever new norm φ is issued by Admin, respecting the relative constraints (concerning 
the content of φ or the procedure for its creation), that norm will be inputted in N.  In this way, the 
legislator transfers to Admin the legislator’s ability to influence people’s behaviour, by exploiting their 
commitment to compliance. 
Not only the generalised commitment to comply with N provides the legislator (and its delegatees) 
with the possibility to influence the behaviour of compliers and judges. It also provides those who are 
able to influence the legislator with the ability to influence the behaviour of all others. Assume for 
instance that Tom is the leader of the party having the majority in the legislative assembly. Then Tom 
can make it so that the legislator adopts the intention to introduce (or repeal) a norm B 
𝑛
⇒ 𝒜, to make 
it so that the population intends to do (and does) action 𝒜 under circumstances B. 
A normative system supported by a generally endorsed policy-based intention to comply can thus 
work as an input-output machine, empowering those who can control its input: by providing 
appropriate normative and factual inputs, they can obtain corresponding intentions and actions and so 
implement their aims. As Karl Olivecrona put it “[t]he purpose of the lawgivers is to influence the 
actions of men, but this can only be done through influencing their minds” (Olivecrona 1971, 21-2, 
Spaak 2009). Thus legislators (and those able to influence them) can use the “machinery of the law” 
for reaching their social, political (and sometimes personal) purposes (see Pattaro 2009, Pattaro 2005). 
Normative systems, in a way, precede certain social powers, and provide for their foundation.  The 
extent of norm-systems based powers may indeed be very large, which explains why developed legal 
systems contain constitutional  limitations  and controls over the exercise of such powers (such as 
democratic  procedures for electing the legislative body, judicial  review over legislation and 
administration, more generally, an institutional  system of “checks and balances”). 
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16. Conclusion 
I have first considered how obligations can be relative to a particular normative systems, and I have 
pro- vided a meta-logical representation of this idea. Then I have analysed the intention to comply 
with a normative system, affirming that that the commitment to comply must be understood as a 
policy-based intention. I have then considered why consequential choosers may come to this 
determination, as simple addressees or enforcement officers. Finally I have developed some 
considerations on how compliance can spread and how it can both restrain and provide power. 
The study of compliance with normative systems involves various aspects I could not address here. 
First of all there is the issue of interpretation, i.e., of determining the content of the normative system 
to be complied with, on the basis of the available  materials  (texts, cases, practices,  values, etc.), a 
problem  that legal theorists have been discussing for centuries, and on whose epistemological-
methodological  nature the debate is still on-going.  Other important issues concern modelling contrary 
to duty obligations (and other technical aspects of deontic logic), taking into account cooperation 
between the involved agents and dependencies and trust relationships between them, addressing 
negotiation and argumentation regarding how to comply and the consequences of violations, 
considering how a shared awareness of each one’s intention to comply and a shared belief in a duty to 
comply can contribute to compliance. 
Finally, the model here presented provides a minimal understanding of the internal point of view 
towards a normative system (i.e., the point of view of an agent that has chosen to use that system as a 
guide to its own behaviour). The analysis of such a point of view can be developed by adding further 
requirements, which may or may not apply with regard to particular normative systems or addressees 
of them: a social or conventional dimension (expected compliance by others contributes to motivate 
one’s compliance),  a shared dimension (there is a common  awareness of each one’s intentions  to 
comply, or a common intention  to comply), a cooperative dimension (the intention to comply 
concerns participation  in a common  project), a hierarchical-authoritative  dimension (there an 
individual  or collective  agent having certain properties, such as those described in Conte and 
Castelfranchi 1995, 84ff, who issues and implements the norms), a believed moral dimension  
(compliance  appears to the concerned agent as the content of a moral  obligation), a claimed moral 
dimension (those producing and enforcing the system claim that there is a moral obligation to comply 
with it), a moral dimension tout court (there is a moral obligation to apply the system or comply with 
it), etc. 
I think  however that such aspects, are complementary but independent of the model developed here, 
which only assumes that the addressees of a normative  system adopt a policy-based intention  to 
comply with it, regardless of the reasons supporting  this intention  and the ways in which the system’s 
content is identified. 
While this work is still very preliminary, I hope it can provide some clues on how the project of 
identifying the cognitive basis of normative behaviour, a project to which Castelfranchi and his 
collaborators have given so many important contributions, can be extended to complex systems of 
norms, rather than being limited to social norms or specific orders of particular authorities. 
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